Back in 2023, I wrote a piece for The Stream entitled “A Jihad on the Term ‘Islamism.'” That article no longer works at the archived site, so I am reposting it here, since so many (even conservatives) need to learn why they should avoid the term.
“A Jihad on the Term ‘Islamism’”—Tim Furnish (2023)
I am hereby declaring a jihad on the word “Islamism.
The term is pervasive. Google it. You’ll get 40 million hits. Over 46 million for one who practices it, an “Islamist.” Writers and analysts of all political persuasions use these terms. Here are some examples from the Right. Dennis Prager, Katherine Gorka (wife of Sebastian), the Trump Administration (in its National Security Strategy, no less), Greg Gutfeld, even The Stream. The Left deploys them probably even more frequently. NPR, The Atlantic, WaPo/CNN, the Council on Foreign Relations, our deep state, the “Global Media Style Guide on Islam.
Both sides of the aisle can’t be wrong, can they? Actually, yes. Here’s why. Both conservatives and liberals/Leftists use “Islamism” as a way to differentiate political Islam from allegedly mainstream Islam. But Islam is inherently political. More so than any other religion on earth. “Islamism” and “Islamist” disguises that. What’s wrong with that? It allows the world’s second-largest religion plausible deniability for its legions of political activist and revolutionaries. It allows apologists to say “they’ve corrupted Islam.” (Much the same argument as is made regarding jihadists.)
When I was in graduate school at Ohio State in the 1990s, “Islamism” had a narrow meaning. The ideology of late 19th/early 2oth century “Islamic modernists.” Mainly in Egypt and Iran. These activists tried to fuse Western political ideas, like democracy, with the Quran. This approach was one of three to Western imperialism and dominance in the Muslim world.
There were two other reactions. One copied Western secularist governments. The Turkish Republic led the way here. On the other end of the spectrum, fundamentalists rejected Western ideas. They favored the idea of Islam al-hall. “Islam is the solution.” Muslims could fix their society by returning to the Quran and hadiths (collected sayings of Muhammad). And putting those teachings into practice. The Wahhabis of Arabia and Deobandis of India typified this strategy.
Now, a century later, here’s how those three approaches have shaken out. Western-style secular governance is almost dead in the greater Middle East. Even Turkey has been re-Islamized. Fundamentalism is stronger than ever, especially in many Sunni countries and regions. Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Pakistan, Afghanistan, northern Nigeria, Sudan. Anywhere that Islamic law is enforced. So what about “Islamic modernism?” It survived in groups like the Muslim Brotherhood. And Turkey’s ruling AK (“Justice and Development”) party.
But a funny, and unfortunate, thing happened to that former middle way. It’s been assimilated to the fundamentalist Islamic strain. At least politically. This happened to the Muslim Brotherhood decades ago. Now it wants Muslims to institute Islamic rule. As such, the Muslim Brotherhood has the same goal as Islamic State or al-Qa`idah. The only real difference is that the MB officially eschews violent jihad. (And its leaders’ beards tend to be shorter than those of IS or AQ.) Of course, MB’s offshoots like Hamas openly embrace jihad.
Granted, not all transnational Islamic organizations (MB-derived or not) are jihadist. But all share the same goals: more Islam in public life, to include the legal system and government. There are three major organizations in this regard. The MB. Hizb al-Tahrir (HT) dedicated to bringing back the caliphate. And the massive Gülen movement of Turkish Sufism (Islamic mysticism). All are very political.
And why wouldn’t they be? Islam is at its very heart political. Much more so than Christianity.
“The Founder of Christianity bade his followers ‘render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s, and unto God the things which are God’s.’” (Matthew 22:21) It was not until Roman Emperor Constantine that Christianity became political. On the other hand, “the Founder of Islam was his own Constantine, and founded his own state and empire. … The dichotomy of regnum and sacerdotium, so crucial in the history of Western Christendom, had no equivalent in Islam.” (Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam, p. 6.) Muhammad’s successors, the caliphs, were not just heads of state, but Allah’s deputies. And their main role — or that of any lesser Muslim potentates, such as a sultans — was to extend Islamic rule over all non-Muslims. Bernard Lewis, again: in Islam political authority is a “divine good” (The Political Language of Islam, p. 25) and should be seized at every opportunity. Not something that risked endangering one’s immortal soul, as in Christianity.
The ayatollahs certainly seized their opportunity in 1979 Iran. Scholars often try to claim the Islamic Republic’s governmental and legal systems owe more to the French political theorist Auguste Comte than to the Quran. But the IRI’s staunch Shi`i roots are 500 years deep. And it wasn’t the Frenchman who came up with flogging for cross-dressing, amputation for theft and stoning for adultery. It was Muhammad and his modern epigone, the Ayatollah Khomeini.
The IRI is Islamic political thought in modern Western garb. Ditto for the MB, HT, Gülenists and AK party members. There are no discernible political differences between these five organizations and the 55 Islamic terrorist groups listed by the U.S. State Department. There are disagreements about how, when, and how much to employ jihad in realizing political goals. To what degree, perhaps, the ends justify the means. But the ends of MB and HT are the same as those of IS and AQ. World government under Islamic law, administered by a caliph.
So why pretend otherwise? Which is what referring to such Muslims as “Islamists” does. They’re simply Muslims. And “Islamism” is just fundamentalist Islam. In this case, “thy name well fits thy faith” (Cymbeline, Act V, Scene 2).
The Occidental Jihadist 